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This paper compares the geopolitical perceptions of Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman) and 
Kim Ku. The major findings are as follows. First, during the period of the Taehan Empire, 
Rhee and Kim had cast off their old Sino-centric geopolitical perceptions and embraced the 
concept of sovereignty. Protestantism, which was crucial to the rise of the modern conception 
of sovereignty, certainly played a role in the establishment of Rhee and Kim’s perceptions. 
Second, during the period in which the Korean Provisional Government experienced internal 
conflicts over whether to partner with the Russian Communists, Kim and Rhee were both 
wary of the expansion of Soviet influence. Third, during the Asia-Pacific War, Rhee and Kim 
advocated a united front with China (Asia) and the U.S. (Pacific) against Japan’s geopolitical 
scheme of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Fourth, Rhee focused on the strength 
and value of the U.S., which was expanding into the Pacific, and relegated China to the 
role of a secondary collaborator. In contrast, Kim valued highly the symbiotic relationship 
with China. Fifth, Rhee had a keen understanding of the global milieu but his senses were 
relatively dull to the revolutionary atmosphere of the Eurasian continent including Asia. On 
the other hand, Kim’s perception of the world was relatively narrow but he was more sensitive 
to the revolutionary atmosphere of the Eurasian continent. Sixth, as the Cold War escalated 
and the two camps jockeyed to keep the Korean Peninsula within their respective spheres of 
influence (in traditional geopolitical terms, continental versus maritime), the differences in 
two men’s geopolitical perceptions began to take center stage rather than their similarities. 
Despite these differences, the similar geopolitical perceptions shared by these two men, who 
contributed to the independence and founding of Korea, can provide a cornerstone for the 
geopolitical strategy of a 21st century Korea working to balance its continental and maritime 
priorities and continuing to face the problem of the North-South division.
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I. INTRoDUcTIoN
This study provides a comparative analysis of the geopolitical perceptions 
of Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman, 1875-1965) and Kim Ku (1876-1949). We 
conceptualize geopolitical perception as a way of seeing the world that an 
individual has vis-à-vis the temporal and spatial milieu surrounding on self 
and that one had developed due to that milieu.1 This concept is part of the 
wider corpus of geopolitics which has been developed by scholars such as 
John Rudolph Kjellén (1864-1922), Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947), and 
Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914). More recent understandings of geopolitics 
tend toward post-modern and decentralized conceptualizations (Flint 2006; 
Lacost 2006; chauprade 2007). Similar viewpoints have also been articulated 
in traditional Korean scholarship; Hong Taeyong (1731-1783), a scholar of 
the Northern Learning School (北學派) in late chosŏn Korea, proposed that 
the concepts of center and periphery are meaningless in an unbounded space 
and consequently argued against the “civilized/barbarian” Sino-centric view 
1 “Geopolitical perception” may be distinguished from “foreign perception” or 
“perception on international politics,” since it takes into account the interaction 
between individuals and their geopolitical milieus and does not clearly distinguish 
between subject and object. other researchers have used the term “foreign perception,” 
which delineates “in” and “out,” but they have run into the problem of where to 
draw the line separating the two. In particular, there is little consensus on where 
that line was during the period of Japanese rule. Geopolitical perception is distinct 
from “perception on international politics,” which is fundamentally about interstate 
relations, since geopolitical perception concerns the perception formed as a result of 
the interaction between an individual and the concentric strata which surround him. 
consequently, an analysis of geopolitical perception is not only concerned with the 
way an individual’s political thinking is shaped by considerations of nation and state, 
but also those arising from history, religion and language. It takes an anthropological 
stance to look at how such factors shape “the whole man” in the community of being 
(seinsverbundenheit).
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of geopolitics (Hong, T. 2008: 158-62).2
This study focuses specifically on the geopolitical perceptions of Syngman 
Rhee and Kim Ku for the following reasons. First, because of their status as 
founding fathers, a comparative understanding of Rhee and Kim’s geopolitical 
perceptions is essential to molding future Korean geopolitical strategy. Not 
only were they significant figures in the Taehan Empire (Taehan cheguk), 
the Korean Provisional Government (Taehan min’guk imsi chŏngbu) and 
the Republic of Korea, their political significance will be also immeasurably 
important in the future of two Koreas. Rhee began his political activities as 
a young member of the Independence club (Tongnip hyŏphoe) and became 
the first president of the Korean Provisional Government in 1919. He later 
became the first president of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Kim’s political 
activities began as a member of the New People’s Association (Sinminhoe), 
which officially proclaimed republic government, advocating Enlightenment 
movement, and he also served as head of the Korean Provisional Government. 
After liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, he and Rhee led opposition 
against the establishment of a Soviet-style communist government, thereby 
contributing to the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Though his efforts 
for establishing a unified government through the compromise between 
North and South Korea, held April 19-30, 1948, in P’yŏngyang, failed, Kim 
will be remembered for his commitment to the ideal of peaceful unification. 
For that ideal is clearly stipulated in the preamble of the Korean constitution 
(Doh, J. 2003: 239-42).
Second, previous researches has mainly compared and contrasted the 
two men as “political leaders of Korea,” within the context of rather specific 
geopolitical space, namely, the Korean Peninsula.3 Moreover, evaluations 
2 Hong, Tae Yong claimed that those sub-entities which had been under Sino-centric 
order and content with its rule could themselves each be a center: “Every spiritual 
thing borne by the sky and raised by the earth is a human being. All those who rise 
above the herd to rule are princes. All those who raise walls and dig moats to protect 
their borders are nations” (Hong, T. 2008: 158-9).
3 Son, Se Il has already conducted a comparative study of Rhee and Kim (Son, S. 1970). 
This study examined the relationship between “place and political orientation,” and 
provided valuable inspiration for this project. Doh, Jin Soon has looked at Korean 
politics between 1945 and 1949 with a focus on Kim and Rhee (Doh, J. 1997a). This 
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limiting the scope of their considerations to the Korean Peninsula or Republic 
of Korea have tended to focus on the split between Rhee and Kim over the 
establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, thereby, leading to somewhat 
polemical controversy on the legitimacy of Republic of Korea.4 This study 
therefore not only examines the geopolitical perception of these two men vis-
à-vis the Korean Peninsula but also beyond that scope, an approach that more 
fully embodies their stories of conflict and collaboration in a wider context. 
The method of “close reading” is employed to analyze the records and 
works of the two men, and relate their contents to the temporal and spatial 
milieu in which they lived. The comparisons can begin simply with the 
sheer gap of amount of records left by the two figures. Rhee was a renowned 
journalist of the Taehan Empire era and a Princeton Ph. D. Working from 
the U.S., he took advantage of his freedom of speech, using Voice of America 
broadcasts as well as writings in both Asian and Western languages to support 
the struggle for Korean sovereignty. consequently, he left a large corpus 
that can be analyzed to better understand his geopolitical perception. Kim, 
however, was more action-oriented and operated under the harsh pursuit 
of the Japanese authorities in Asia, leaving few writings.5 Therefore, we will 
study similarly brought into focus the global significance of Kim and Rhee in history.
4 In a debate held among scholars and the press on the 60th anniversary of the Republic 
of Korea (2008), Shin, Yong Ha asserted that the proposition that Kim had not 
participated in the establishment of Korea was a misconception. He argued that 
what Kim did not participate in, if anything, was the establishment of a ‘divided 
government.’ This seems to represent a mix of both positive valuations of Kim’s 
political legacy and reservations about Korea (Shin, Y. 2008: 157, 169). To learn more 
about the political and academic debate surrounding the use of Kim Ku’s likeness 
on the ₩100,000 bill, see the following: “10 man wŏn kwŏn amsal chiryŏng: P’yojŏk 
ŭn Kim Ku” (“order of assassination on the ₩100,000 bill: Kim Ku is the Target”), 
Han’gyŏreh, November 14, 2008.
5 The correspondence and various writings in mixed script of Rhee are included in 
Ihwajang sojang Ungam Yi Sŭngman munsŏ tongmun p’yŏn (18 volumes). His letters 
were also separately published in Yi Sŭngman tongmun sŏhan chip (3 volumes). In 
Korean, Rhee authored Tongnip Chŏngsin (Independence-oriented thinking, 1910) and 
Han’guk kyohoe p’ippak (Persecution of the Korean church, 1913), and he also translated 
Ch’ŏng-Il chŏn’gŭi (The first Sino-Japanese War, 1917) (these three works are included 
in the above compilations). In English, he wrote Neutrality as Influenced by the United 
States (1912), which was the book based on his doctoral dissertation, and Japan Inside 
The Geopolitical Perceptions of Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee 109
utilize his own works to the extent possible, but also rely on the recollections 
of his acquaintances, documents assumed to have influenced his perception, 
and his actual actions to indirectly indicate his geopolitical perception.
II.  THE INITIAL FoRMATIoN oF TWo MEN’S 
GEoPoLITIcAL PERcEPTIoNS
Born in 1875 and 1876 respectively, Rhee and Kim both spent more than 
twenty years of their lives as subjects, not citizens, of the chosŏn Dynasty. 
Both Rhee, a scion of a fallen branch of the royal family, and Kim, who 
came from a ruined family of yangban origins and was treated as a low class 
commoner, entirely devoted themselves to preparing for the civil service 
examination in their early years. Under the rule of the chosŏn Dynasty, the 
examination was the only road available to them to achieve upward social 
mobility.6 Rhee thought that “learning the chinese classics, literature, history, 
culture, and religion and taking the examination” was his duty, and believed 
that “there is no religion superior to confucianism.” When Kim first met the 
teacher of his village school (sŏdang), he considered him “a god or a sage.” 
(Ch’ŏngnyŏn Yi Sŭngman Chasŏjŏn, 1995: 85; Kim, K. 2008: 53) After the 
Manchu invasion of 1636, chosŏn was incorporated into the Qing-centered 
Sino-centric order of Northeast Asia, and the only way to become an elite 
intellectual in chosŏn society was to gain expertise in the learning and 
philosophy that came in from china.7 During their early years, as with most 
Out: The Challenge of Today (1941). Both English works are now available in Korean. 
Kim’s Paekpŏm ilji and Towaesilgi are both included in Paekpŏm Kim Ku chŏnjip, 
12 volumes). Kim’s works mainly report his personal experiences and actions, and 
are therefore of a different nature from the works of Rhee, which clearly express his 
political opinions.
6 Looking at the self-consciousness of the two individuals, Rhee had a “royal 
consciousness,” while Kim had “a commoner complex” (Son, S. 2008: 21-57). 
However, neither Kim nor Rhee was in the ruling class of chosŏn society. No one in 
Rhee’s family up to seven generations back had risen to government office or even 
passed the qualifying civil service examinations  (chŏng, P. 2005: 52).
7 Although chosŏn society idealized the Ming Empire and looked down on the Qing 
Empire, Sino-centrism even toward the Qing remained. For example, Kim, Yun Sik 
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of their peers, the geopolitical perceptions of both Rhee and Kim were Sino-
centric in nature.
The Treaty of Shimonoseki (下關條約), which ended the Qing-Japan War 
in 1895, stimulated an awareness of the modern perception of sovereignty 
among the people of chosŏn by specifying in the first clause that “the full 
and complete independence and autonomy of Korea.” In such a transitional 
milieu, the geopolitical perceptions of Rhee and Kim were transformed. While 
Rhee’s transformation was revolutionary, Kim went through a more gradual 
process of change involving much self-doubt and hesitation. Rhee joined the 
Hyŏpsŏnghoe,8 an organization established by Philip Jaisohn (Sŏ, chae P’il, 
1864-1951), and went on to engage in political and journalistic activities in 
the Independence club. The Independence was a kind of zeitgeist at that time, 
and that prevailing atmosphere was epitomized by the establishment of the 
Taehan Empire, which was proclaimed as the first modern sovereign state on 
the peninsula, on october 12, 1897. In the same year, when Rhee graduated 
from Paijai (Baejae) school, he gave a speech titled “the Independence of 
Korea,” similarly fitting in with the times (Han, H. 1976: 84-108; Kim, M. and 
Kim, S. 2008: 63-6).
During this period, Kim lived in hiding with An T’aehun (1862-1905), the 
father of An chunggŭn (1879-1910), because of the role he played as a leader 
of the defeated Tonghak movement. Unlike Rhee who viewed the Qing-
Japan War and the year 1895 in terms of the concept of independence (Rhee, 
S. 1993: 109-94), Kim actually experienced battle against Japanese forces 
during the Tonghak revolt. Kim’s studies of Tonghak philosophy formed 
the foundation of his geopolitical perceptions, which opposed Western 
imperialism in protecting the East.9
(1835-1922) considered the Qing court the center of culture and a political power. As 
long as confucian civilization remained, it mattered little whether the Manchus or the 
Han chinese actually ruled china (Jang, I. 2002: 256-7).
8 Translator’s note (hereafter TN). The Hyŏpsŏnghoe was a debating society that was a 
forerunner to the Independence club. 
9 Son Se Il thought that Tonghak, based on the principles of “anti-western, anti-
Japanese, all people are equal (反洋反倭萬民平等),” was influential in the establishment 
of Kim’s nationalism (Son, S. 1970: 18). Prior to joining the Tonghak movement, Kim 
read the Tonggyŏng taejŏn and Yongdam yusa (Kim, K. 2008: 69). Regarding his state 
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Kim intensified his anti-western perceptions through his studies of “clear 
away the false” (斥邪, ch’ŏksa) thought, even though Tonghak did not agree 
with the whole points of that philosophy except its anti-western element. 
During his time with An T’aehun, Kim met Ko Nŭngsŏn, a confucian 
scholar of the Hwasŏ school.10 Ko’s teaching of the confucian idea of moral 
righteousness (義理) served to inspire Kim for the rest of his life (Kim, K. 
2008: 100-6). Ko Nŭngsŏn advised Kim to visit Qing china to find ways to 
save their country. Kim visited Qing twice and during his second visit, he met 
the son of Xu Yusheng, a general who died in the service of the Qing during 
the Qing-Japan War, and became his sworn brother near the Amnok (ch., 
Yalu) River (Kim, K. 2008: 109-11, 123-5).11 Kim’s efforts during this period 
to save his country through ties with the Qing were not irrelevant to his later 
efforts to support Korean sovereignty through close cooperation with china 
during the years of the independence movement and the Asia-Pacific War.
The transformation of Kim’s geopolitical perception occurred after the 
1897 proclamation of the Taehan Empire. The new books he read while in 
his imprisonment at Inch’ŏn prison set him free from the conventional Sino-
centric worldview. In particular, Kim found limitations to the lessons of Ko 
Nŭngsŏn while reading books such as a translation of Robert MacKenzie’s 
of mind when he joined the Tonghak movement, he stated: “When they told me, as 
I grieved over my plight as a commoner, that there is equality among those within 
Tonghak, and when I was told that there would be a new nation since the fate of the 
chosŏn Dynasty was sealed, I was reminded of the grief I experienced taking the 
civil service examination” (Kim, K. 2008: 69). But later, Kim sometimes regretted his 
decision as “a folly, like chasing the wind” (Kim, K. 2008: 102). 
10 TN. The Hwasŏ school was adamantly opposed to the opening of Korea and to the 
acceptance of Western thought.
11 Doh Jinsoon states that Kim’s efforts to collaborate with the Qing court were based 
on veneration of the Ming Empire and looked to the Qing in a realist light, only to 
borrow their strength. But as described in footnote seven, at that time, it was hard to 
differentiate between veneration aimed at the Ming and Qing Empires, and both were 
at the heart of Sino-centrism. The Hwasŏ school was sympathetic to the Qing Empire. 
For example, Yu In Sŏk (1842-1915) asserted that breaking off relations with the Qing 
and proclaiming independence were not matters to be celebrated but rather, mourned. 
Many Hwasŏ scholars even favored the despotic rule in Korea of Yuan Shikai (1859-
1916) after the Imo Kullan (壬午軍亂, Military Mutiny of 1882) (oh, Y. 1999: 230).
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A History of the Nineteenth Century, and he consequently adopted the view 
that there were things to be learned from countries all around the world 
(Kim, K. 2008: 184).12 Kim’s epiphany in prison and change in geopolitical 
perception was very similar to the experience of Rhee described later in 
this paper (Lee, M. 2007: 60). Thenceforth, Kim regretted that he had ever 
considered breaking off his friendship with An T’aehun due to allegations by 
Ko Nŭngsŏn that An had an interest in Western learning. He resolved to “learn 
loyalty from confucian scholars but also the best cultural and institutional 
practices of countries around the world.” The fact that Kim, having cut off his 
topknot, met Ko Nŭng Sŏn, and refuted his views as followed remark, offers a 
clear proof to the magnitude of the change in Kim’s geopolitical perception.
I told him of the state of the world as I learned from the books I had read and 
the unreasonableness of his philosophy of revering china and treating the 
Westerners as barbarians, and that we should not simply label as uncivilized 
barbarians those who have big noses and recessed eyes . . . How can we reject 
the barbarians of other countries when we can’t even do the same with the 
barbarians in our country? Those countries across the sea are well-organized 
and civilized. Their regulations and institutions are more advanced, though 
they have never seen even the shadow of confucius or Mencius . . . In my 
opinion, there are many things we should learn from the barbarians, and 
indeed many we should discard from confucius and Mencius (Kim, K. 2008: 
272-3).
Such statements clearly demonstrate Kim’s desire to diverge from a Sino-centric 
geopolitical perception.13 Although Kim and Rhee had different trajectories, 
the establishment of the Taehan Empire in 1897 and accompanying social 
transformation incited in both a strong desire for independence from china.
For both Rhee and Kim, joining the Protestant church marked a shift in 
their perceptions of the world. Sino-centrism cast the emperor of china as 
12 Son Se Il also focuses on the influence of this translation of MacKenzie’s book on the 
transformation of Kim’s perceptions (Son, S. 2008: 439-48).
13 Lhee Hojeh has some reservation on this evaluation. He understands Kim’s perception 
at this time as a postponement. He argues that Kim had left behind “the confucian 
conception of a Sino-centric international political order,” but did not have a “new 
conception of international order” which could replace it (Lhee, H. 1994: 353).
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the ‘Son of Heaven’ and ranked the countries around china in a hierarchy 
with a strictness approaching that of a kind of religion. Protestantism lent 
great moral support to the cause of Korean independence because temporally 
it offered a better world to come beyond Sino-centric world and spatially it 
was directly related with the Western powers. Though Rhee sympathized 
with Philip Jaisohn and H. G. Appenzeller’s (1858-1902) western political 
ideas from the outset, he initially rejected Protestantism, asking “How can 
an educated scholar believe such stupid dogmas when he already knows 
the great Buddha and the wisdom of confucius?” (Ch’ŏngnyŏn Yi Sŭngman 
Chasŏjŏn, 1995: 86) However, he converted in 1899, while he was imprisoned 
at Han-sung prison. He stated that “although the teachings of Protestantism 
may not have been true, I firmly believed that they were uniquely able to 
change the hearts of our people, which had been so egoistic and self-centered 
as to be indifferent to the well-being of our compatriots” (Lee, J. 2002: 101). 
Rhee reconciled the ideals of Protestantism with those of independence. 
Protestantism led Rhee’s geopolitical perception to encompass the system 
of sovereign states established by the Peace of Westphalia, which had been 
spreading since the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 (Kim, M. and Kim, S. 
2008: 81-2).14
Like Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku also accepted Protestantism after he 
experienced imprisonment, escape, a journey to the southern region 
of Korea, and the deaths of his father and fiancé. His entrance into the 
Protestant church was as important as his meeting with Ko Nŭngsŏn, in the 
sense that it was accompanied by intensive study of the Bible and training 
as a church leader. A Bible class in P’yŏngyang that Kim attended followed 
a strict religious training that taught doctrine and faith through a schedule 
comprising of “an early morning prayer meeting, breakfast, 30 minutes of 
worship, morning Bible study, lunch, afternoon bible study, choral lessons, 
spreading the Gospel, dinner, and an evening of discussion” (Kim, K. 
2008: 285-8; ok, S. 2001: 30-1; choi, G. 2003: 33). The following statement 
from Kim demonstrates his synthesis of Protestantism and the ideal of 
14 It can be argued that Protestantism itself is an evenness-friendly religion. The 
emergence and rise of Protestantism is often interpreted in the context of the 
“democratization of faith” (McGrath 2007: 52).
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independence, similar to that of Rhee.
In P’yŏngan-do, and needless to mention Hwanghae-do, education reform 
began in Yesugyo (Jesus religion). Most people who supported cultural 
development were the followers of Yesugyo. People who had been exclusively 
concerned with bolting the door and maintaining tradition learned about the 
outside world from the tongues of western people. The followers of Yesugyo 
are mostly people of the middle class and therefore barely learned and foolish, 
but this only made it easier for them to learn from even the words of half-
dumb missionaries; those who frequently listened not only learned faith 
but also patriotism. Therefore, it is an unavoidable truth that those who are 
patriotic are also the believers of Yesugyo. An old friend of mine, U chongsŏ, 
was a missionary, and at his urging, I decided to devote myself to education 
reform and believe in Yesu (Jesus) after my mourning [for my father and 
fiancé] ended (Kim, K. 2008: 285).
Like Rhee, Protestantism not only provided a religious faith for Kim but also 
formed the ideological foundation that led to his new geopolitical perception. 
As Hong Taeyong before him, Kim acquired a geopolitical perception that 
can be thought of as concentric circles centered on oneself and one’s own 
nation, rather than being fixed on traditional imperial subject-hood and 
the central State (中國, china). Though the two men acquired their belief 
in independence through different experiences, the Protestantism helped 
consolidate the foundations of their ideologies.
Rhee and Kim’s geopolitical perceptions were again transformed by the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). This was the consequence of intellectual 
efforts to discern what threats there were to Korea’s sovereignty after the 
dissolution of the Sino-centric order.15 Rhee viewed Russia through the same 
pro-independence lens through which he had viewed the Qing Empire, and 
as a result, was persecuted by the royal circle of Korean government, which 
adopted a pro-Russia policy. Rhee’s short interest in Japan’s anti-Russian pan-
15 This refers to the perception of the threats posed by Russia and Japan, which arose 
after the fall of the Sino-centric order. Lhee Hojeh asserts that the Ch’ŏn-Il ch’aek, 
written by Min Yŏng Hwan (1861-1905), is the first modern foreign policy work 
written by a Korean. He believes it to show that caution toward Russia and Japan has 
long been a part of Korean diplomacy.
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Asianism, which was attractive to some Koreans, was associated with the 
geopolitical circumstances during this period (oliver 2002: 59-60). His anti-
Russian stance was strengthened through his readings and entrance into the 
Protestant church during his imprisonment. Rhee believed Russia’s aggressive 
nature came from the Russian orthodox church, which had proclaimed 
imperial universality like Sino-centrism, and he believed that Russia’s 
geopolitical ambitions toward Europe, which had been thwarted by the 
crimean War (1853-1856), were now pointed at Asia (Lew, Y. 2002: 322-3). 
Even before the spread of Russian communism, Rhee viewed the expansion 
of the Russian empire with a vigilant stance.
Kim’s anti-Russian geopolitical perception was similar to those of Rhee 
and other contemporary intellectual elites. The Tonghak movement, in which 
Kim once participated, considered Russia the most threatening invader of all 
external powers (Lhee, H. 1994: 59). It is also likely that Kim’s geopolitical 
wariness toward Russia’s territorial ambitions was strengthened by reading 
MacKenzie’s book, which was covered with overtone of Russo-phobia.16 
However, he was more suspicious of Japan than Russia. Kim, who had already 
directly expressed his hostility against Japan through his involvement in the 
Tonghak rebellion and the killing of Tsuchida Joryo, whom Kim suspected 
for his involvement in the assassination of Empress Myŏngsŏng (Queen 
Min), fled to Sajik-dong of changnyŏn county after the Japanese occupation 
of P’yŏngyang  in 1904 (Kim, K. 2008: 661). He also started an anti-Japan 
demonstration and petition following the conclusion of the so-called Japan-
Korea Treaty of 1905 (乙巳勒約).17 The persistent tendency that Kim kept 
a wary eye on Russia but an even more alert one on Japan is a theme that 
continued even into his post-1945 independence political orientation.
With the establishment of the Great Korea (Taehan) Empire in 1897, 
16 The original version of The 19th Century: A History, on chapter five of the third book 
describes Russia as follows: “During this intervention period(from Peter the Great to 
Alexandre II), the history of Russia is a record of incessant expansion to all directions” 
(Mackenzie 1880: 379). The book reflects the Great Game between Britain and Russia. 
That is to say, there is clearly seen the cautiousness with which the British regarded 
Russia. Rhee also carefully read this book and his geopolitical perception was 
influenced by it (Lew, Y. 2002: 91-3).
17 Kim perceived Japan as consistently imperialistic both before and after WWII.
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Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku firmly believed in Korean independence and 
Korean sovereignty. Rhee once offered a response to the popular notion that 
“the people of chosŏn had been subjects of china for many years—so why 
independence now?” He argued that “independence allows people to avoid 
being treated as beasts, and adults being treated as children.”18 To enervated 
yangban and idle commoners, Kim issued a call to “wake up, whether 
yangban or commoner!” (Kim, K. 2008: 314-5) Rhee and Kim learned 
through Protestantism the reality of the geopolitical situation surrounding 
the newly born Great Korea Empire, and began to see with a vigilant stance 
threats from both land (Russia) and sea (Japan) following the dissolution of 
the Sino-centric regional order.
III.  PoLITIcAL SPLIT WITHIN THE KoREAN PRoVISIoNAL 
GoVERNMENT, AND THE TWo MEN’S GEoPoLITIcAL 
PERcEPTIoNS
Established in 1919, the Korean Provisional Government (Taehan min’guk 
imsi chŏngbu) embodied the spirit of national sovereignty envisioned in 1917 
by the “Proclamation of Great Solidarity” and claimed legitimate succession 
to the Taehan Empire, as seen in the preservation of the name “Taehan” 
(Yun, D. 2006: 36-7). Through its struggles over the next twenty-seven 
years, the Provisional Government left an outstanding mark on the history 
of anti-colonialism worldwide.19 In the initial phase of the Government, 
Rhee and Kim walked together under the same cause, with Rhee becoming 
the first president of the Provisional Government in 1919, and Kim the 
Director General of the Police Bureau. During this period, Rhee operated 
in the U.S., warily watching the links between the U.S.’s “open Door Policy” 
toward china and Japanese expansionism on the continent. Meanwhile, Kim 
operated in china, opposing communism, which was rapidly spreading on 
18 “P’aemanghan nara tŭl ŭi tanghan kyŏlsil” (“The results of the defeated and ruined 
countries”), Cheguk sinmun, February 28, 1903.
19 Kim Hŭi Gon argues that Korea through this process experienced a modernization 
equivalent to a civil revolution, which he calls “the theory of modernization through 
the independence movement” (Kim, H. 2009).
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the Eurasian landmass, and keeping a hopeful eye on the Pacific. The activities 
of the two men reflect the commonalities in their geopolitical perceptions.20
Rhee’s geopolitical perception is well described in his doctoral dissertation, 
“Neutrality as Influenced by the United States.”21 His proposal which was 
based on the core implication of his dissertation, that Korea should be made 
a mandated territory through the League of Nation under the U.S. leadership, 
became an ongoing issue of controversy and undermined his credibility to 
lead independence movement. However, at the time at least, the approach 
to recovering sovereignty through collaboration with the U.S. itself was 
the one adopted by the Provisional Government. It made sense that the 
Provisional Government gave more consideration to the U.S. than the Russia 
(later Soviet Union, 1922). The U.S. was emerging as a major world power 
both economically and politically, and was orchestrating the Paris Peace 
conference (1919) as one of the victors of World War I , whereas Russia was 
suffering from devastating influence of post-revolution civil war (Manela 
2007: 52-3). At that time, Kim was serving as police head, and wasn’t as 
prominent as Rhee, An ch’ang Ho (1878-1938), or Yi Tong Hwi (1873-1935), 
who were the top three leaders of the Provisional Government. But since the 
police of provisional government had the authority and even clout to exercise 
lethal force  in the Shanghai French concession (where the menacing force 
of Japanese secret service operated), by the 1920’s Kim was considered by 
the Japanese police as one of the five most powerful men in the Korean 
Provisional Government (Kim, K. 2008: 467-8). 
It is possible that Kim was antipathetic to the way that Rhee reduced the 
status of Provisional Government to a symbol, refusing to come to Shanghai 
and instead pursuing diplomatic activities through the Washington D.c. 
20 There is no way to know with certainty how Rhee and Kim perceived WWI at this 
time. In the case of Rhee, we have a passage from Japan Inside Out (1941) which states 
that the losers of the Paris Peace conference were the democratic states that could 
not achieve cohesion, but this critique was written after the outbreak of WWII with 
the advantage of hindsight, and cannot be taken as reflecting his views at the time in 
question.
21 In this piece, Rhee concludes that the most important problems to be resolved with 
American influence were “1) the approval of independence, 2) the inviolability of the 
sovereignty of neutral states, 3) freedom of neutral trade” (Rhee 2000: 145).
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based Korean commission (Sin, P. 2003: 372-4). But Kim still aligned himself 
with Rhee’s pro-U.S. line rather than the pro-Russia stance of Yi Tonghwi. 
This is clearly seen in his refusal to join the Korean communist Party22 
in Shanghai, despite the request of Yi Tonghwi. He not only refused the 
request but issued the following stern warning to Yi, who was then the Prime 
Minister:
I asked in response, “Will we be able to lead a communist revolution by 
ourselves without the orders or guidance of the 3rd International?” Yi answered 
in the negative and said it was impossible. I told him firmly, “an independence 
movement without Korean identity, under the orders of the 3rd comintern, is 
a meaningless movement without self-respect. Your call runs counter to the 
charter of the Korean Provisional Government, and it is definitely wrong. I 
cannot follow your guidance. I politely ask you to be more self-restraining” 
(Kim, K. 2008: 473-4).
Kim’s geopolitical perception can be seen in the conflicts surrounding the 
three big issues at that time, namely, convention of National Representatives 
(Shanghai), the Washington Naval conference (Washington), and the First 
congress of the Toilers of the Far East (Moscow), all held during the years 
1921 and 1922. The Washington conference, held from November 1921 
to February 1922, launched the Washington Treaty System, composed of 
(among other things) the Nine-Power Treaty aimed at the preservation of 
chinese territorial integrity, the “open Door Policy,” and the Four-Power 
Treaty, which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Washington Treaty 
System achieved a kind of compromise or interim solution in the struggle 
between the U.S. and Japan over supremacy in the Pacific under a multilateral 
framework. An effort by Rhee and his Korean commission to raise the 
Korea problem during the conference was not successful, and Rhee’s pro-U.S. 
foreign policy was seen to have irrevocably failed (Ko, J. 2006: 23). Kim Kyu 
Sik (1881-1950), who had worked with Rhee in the Korean commission, also 
began to advocate a position that was anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet. Furthermore, 
22 The Korean communist Party of Shanghai was established in 1920 in Shanghai and 
held as its objectives the followings: organizing a unified Korean communist Party 
and the recognition by the comintern (Lim, K. 2004: 194-205).
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Kim Kyu Sik participated in the First congress of the Toilers of the Far 
East, and criticized the U.S. for unmasking itself and entering into a treaty 
with the exploitative nations of England, France, and Japan, “Bloodsucker 
nations” (Kim, K. 1922: 137-47).23 Demanding a pro-Soviet realignment and 
adjustment of political orientation in the government, which had begun in 
1921, and concurrent calls for Syngman Rhee’s resignation and reconstruction 
of the Korean Provisional Government were only strengthened following the 
conference in Moscow. There was severe conflict between the reconstruct 
faction (改造派), which advocated the reformation and expansion of the 
Korean Provisional Government, and a more radical faction (創造派), which 
advocated the complete dissolution of the Korean Provisional Government in 
favor of a new government. Eventually, the radical faction broke off, chartered 
a new separate government, and moved to Vladivostok to seek support and 
approval from the Soviet Union, but ended up a failure (Yun, Y. 2006: 202-4, 
220-7).
During this time, Kim was included in a faction that defended the Korean 
Provisional Government and was considered “an absolute supporter of the 
provisional government in fully putting his trust on the current president and 
his cabinet members” (Yun, D. 2006: 205).24 When Yŏ, Un Hyŏng (1886-1947) 
attended the Moscow conference in 1922, Kim resigned his membership in 
the New Korea Youth Association (Sinhan ch’ŏngnyŏndang) which had been 
launched by Yŏ. 
Kim also thought that those who advocated the convention of National 
Representatives were sponsored by Moscow. once he became Minister of the 
Interior for the Provisional Government, his first decree was an immediate 
dissolution of the convention of National Representatives (Kim, K. 2008: 
23 The First congress of the Toilers of the Far East was held in Moscow January 21, 
1921 to February 2, 1922. As representative of the Korean delegation, Kim, Kyu Sik 
gave a speech in which he sharply contrasted the U.S. and Russia (Lim, K. 2004: 523). 
However, after he witnessed the realities of Soviet tyranny, he left behind his pro-
communist stance (Lee, c. 1974: 88-9).
24 Kim told Pak, Ŭn Sik (1859-1925), who was advocating the convention of 
National Representatives, that “if you go ahead with the convention of National 
Representatives, you will become a bigger enemy of the people than Yi, Wan Yong” 
(Paekpŏm chŏnjip p‘yŏnch‘an wiwŏnhoe 1982: 127).
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475-7). Kim did not sympathize with the effort to incriminate and dismiss 
Rhee in 1925.25 Some of anti-Rhee element in the government who did 
argued as follows:
The purpose of diplomacy is to further the interests of one’s nation through 
negotiations with other countries. Taking this into consideration, a country 
in our situation should have chosen china, small other nations, the Soviet 
Union and the 3rd International as the primary targets of our diplomacy, 
since they are also suffering from and stand against aggressive capitalism and 
imperialism. There are other world powers such as the U.S., Great Britain, 
and France who are fighting Japan for their rights and interests in china and 
the Pacific but they can be no more than a secondary consideration for us. 
However, Rhee considered the Soviet Union a threat because it is red and 
china not an option because it is weak, holding only the U.S. [in high esteem] 
as the sky in servitude because it is white and strong. But I have yet to hear of 
any support from the U.S. for our national independence movement.26
Pak, Ŭn Sik, who succeeded Rhee as President of the Provisional Government, 
emphasized a geopolitical strategy, which embodied perceptions such as the 
one above, involving alliances with china, the Soviet Union, and India. Pak, 
Ŭn Sik thought that through its successful revolution, Russia had gone from 
aggressive expansionism to republicanism (Im, K. 2004: 44). Based on such 
perceptions, Pak, Ŭn Sik argued as follows:
our independence movement must move of our own will, our own words, 
and with the collaboration of 400 million chinese, 150 million Russians, and 
300 million Indians, so that we may improve our people’s knowledge, arouse 
25 It appears that at this time, Kim, along with cho Soang (1887-1958) and others, 
corresponded with Rhee to discuss a series of measures to prevent the outbreak of 
chaos in the provisional government. Rhee replied to Kim as follows: “Through the 
exchange of several letters with cho Soang, we knew that you were doing your best 
with us. I had long hoped to share words with you, so thank you for writing me first. 
The long-sighted plan you showed us is definitely one we must implement, but which 
we cannot being without financial support” (Yu, Y. et al. 2009: 10-1).
26 “Yi Sŭngman kun ege irŏn ŭl yŏ hanora” (“A word to Mr. Rhee Syngman”), Tongnip 
sinmun, March 31, 1925.
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sympathy around the world, and pose a threat to our enemies.27
Thus, the impeachment of Rhee in Shanghai occurred against the backdrop of 
conflicting geopolitical perceptions, with a U.S. and Pacific-centric viewpoint 
on the one hand, and another focusing on Russia, china, India, and other 
countries on the Eurasian continent instead of Western powers.28 In the 
midst of this heating controversy, the fact that the geopolitical perceptions 
of Kim and Rhee were in accord has significant implication. What made this 
accordance possible? 
First, from Kim’s point of view, in order to deal with the financial 
difficulties of the Provisional Government, it was necessary to get funding 
from countrymen living overseas in America, who were relatively prosperous. 
Kim had seen how the pernicious internal struggle caused by financial 
support from Moscow contributed to the disunion of the Provisional 
Government by promoting the factionalism of Yi Tonghwi and his followers. 
Therefore, Kim believed that severing relations with western societies 
would undermine the practical and financial foundations of the Provisional 
Government, since they were operating in the international city of Shanghai.
Around the time of President Rhee’s inauguration, many chinese and even 
western people with their blue eyes and big noses sought out the Korean 
Provisional Government, but now, no one comes by …. We could not but 
place the fate of the Korean Provisional Government in the hands of brothers 
overseas …. There are tens of thousands of Koreans living in America, Hawaii, 
Mexico, and cuba, and though they were mostly laborers, at least their hearts 
were full of the patriotism they had been taught by Philip Jaisohn, Dr. Rhee, 
An ch’angho, and Pak Yongman (Kim, K. 2008: 490-1, 494).
Second, it was the Soviet Union, rather than the U.S., which provoked anti-
western sentiments in Kim while he was operating in china. At the time, 
27 “Tongnip undong ŭi tae pangch’im ŭl pujinham” (“Unable to advance the independence 
movement”), Tongnip sinmun, october 21, 1925. 
28 That even An ch’ang Ho, who was by no means a socialist, in 1921 began supporting 
the coalition of Korea, china, and the Red Russia against Japan, was a sign of the 
times (Yi, A. 1999: 23-7).
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Lenin was planning to harness the energy of colonized peoples in Asia to 
compensate for the falling off of revolutionary fervor in 1920s Europe (carrère 
d’Encausse 1985: 15-9). This Soviet operation fed into the anti-Russian 
sentiments that Kim had harbored since the time of the Taehan Empire. Kim 
could not speak English, nor could he speak chinese. With the chinese he 
was at least able to communicate in writing, but even this was not possible 
with the Russians. This was in a similar vein to Kim’s later views that blind 
obedience toward Soviet communism was flunkeyism. 
our people’s sad fate is the product of worshiping flunkeyism. No one was 
concerned with the people’s happiness and the nation’s interest. We preferred 
to fight for centuries to strengthen the theories of Zhu Xi, while our own 
national spirit withered away. The only thing we developed is a reliance on 
others, so how could we not face ruin …. Those who sneered at the blind 
followers of chengzi (cheng Yi) and Zhu Xi are now the ones who blindly 
follow Lenin. Immature Koreans must come to their senses (Kim, K. 2008: 
541).
In contrast to Rhee who operated in America, Kim’s sphere of influence 
was in Eurasia, but his geopolitical perception was not confined to that 
continental framework.
IV.  THE ASIA-PAcIFIc WAR AND THE TWo MEN’S 
GEoPoLITIcAL PERcEPTIoNS
The history of the Asia-Pacific War, which started in turmoil of Manchu  and 
china in 1930s and ended in the demise of the Japanese Empire in 1945, 
brought a convergence of the geopolitical perceptions of the two men who 
had been working for Korean independence on opposite sides of the Pacific.29 
Kim thought that there would be an all-out war between china and Japan, 
which would eventually result in Korea’s restoration of sovereignty. This was 
consistent with the geopolitical perception that Kim acquired while he was 
29 This paper refers to the war which occurred in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland 
from 1937 to 1945 as the “Asia-Pacific War” (Kim, M. 2009: 75-81).
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traveling in Qing china following the Qing-Japan War (1894-1895). Kim’s 
view on an all-out war between china and Japan was also convergent with 
Rhee’s life-long prediction of the “inevitability of war between the U.S. and 
Japan.” This was because Kim believed that a china-Japan war would certainly 
expand into a world war in which Japan would be defeated (The Association 
of commemorative Service for Kim Koo Scholarship ed., 1982: 235, 249-50; 
Namp’a Pak ch’anik chŏn’gi kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 1989: 205, 232). 
In spite of severe financial hardship, Kim was preparing some funds from 
Koreans residing in America for an “impressive undertaking” (Kim, K. 2008: 
493, 498).30 For Kim, the Manchurian Incident (1931) was a harbinger of war 
between china and Japan. What Kim planned to do with the money from 
Koreans in America was to take advantage of the opportunities presented 
by a Sino-Japanese conflict to resolve the discord that Japan had sown 
between Korea and china (Kim, K. 2008: 502). The heroic activities of Yi 
Bong chang, on January 8, 1932, and Yun Bong Gil, on April 29, 1932, were 
planned against this backdrop, and were extremely effective for that purpose. 
Their actions stimulated both moral and material support from Koreans in 
America (Kim, K. 2008: 505), and more importantly, gave impetus to serious 
collaboration between Kim and the Guomindang led by chiang Kai-shek 
(Kim, K. 2008: 522-3).
After the patriotic martyrdom of Yun, Kim published Towaesilgi, in which 
he recounted the facts of the incident and prescribed a symbiotic relationship 
between Korea and china, drawing on the history of the 16th century Imjin 
War (1592-1598) to emphasize the bonds between the two countries:
Violent Japan’s invasion of china was similar to their actions towards us …. 
India was a large country but was ruined, while Nepal lives on, despite its 
small size. This teaches us that the size of a country does not determine its 
fate, but rather how hard its people are willing to fight …. china has lost its 
northeast but if its 400 million people resist without fear of death, its weakness 
30 During this time, Kim was “researching what would be useful to our people, and 
whether I would be able to do those things.” He recalls that “coincidentally, several 
hundred dollars arrived from Hawaii. I hid it away in a money pouch in some raggedy 
clothes and continued living like a beggar, just as before. I was the only one that knew 
that there was over a thousand dollars hidden under these threadbare clothes.”
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can become strength and it can expect progress towards a desirable outcome. 
our 30 million Koreans will support our allies with our hearts and bodies to 
chase out our foes. When Japan tried to invade Ming china through Korea, 
we refused their request and consequently, we suffered the ravages of war. 
But we were able to secure victory with the help of the Ming. It is clear that 
our relationship is one of mutual benefit, so called Soon-chi (脣齒, relationship 
between lips and teeth).31
The Yi and Yoon’s activities which were mentioned above arranged by Kim 
were the outcomes of such a geopolitical perception. In his preface to the 
1946 edition of Towaesilgi, Rhee who was generally skeptical to terrorism 
also opined that “the martyrdom of Yun was not a simple act of terror but 
an event that helped realize the alliance between the Guomindang and the 
Korean Provisional Government, an event of international significance that 
was felt even at the cairo conference” (The Association of commemorative 
Service for Kim Koo Scholarship 1999: 667).
As the Manchurian Incident transformed into the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937) and the Asia-Pacific War (1941), the destinies of china and the U.S., 
as well as Korea’s independence, became intertwined. As the Sino-Japanese 
conflict escalated, Kim authored a treatise titled “A Warning to the People 
of china” in which he stated that “china’s entrance into the fight gave me 
and my comrades a chance to seek retribution for 29 years of grievance,” and 
that “when china wins its fight, other weaker smaller nations will be able 
to gain strength from its victory and achieve freedom.” He therefore urged 
cooperation between the Provisional Government and china in the struggle 
against Japan (chu, H. 1972: 105).
Meanwhile, Rhee made assertions toward the Americans which were 
similar to what Kim said about the chinese. In his book Japan Inside Out, 
written in 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Rhee stated that:
on the other hand, if the American people had seen Japan in 1894 and 1904 
31 Towaesilgi is a booklet published by Kim in December 1932 to spread the word to the 
chinese about Korea’s anti-Japanese efforts. This book, which was first published in 
chinese, was translated into Korean, slightly supplemented and republished in 1946 
by Ŏm Hangsŏp (Towaesilgi, The Association of commemorative Service for Kim 
Koo Scholarship ed., 1999: 662).
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as they see her today, they would have looked askance at Japan’s annexation 
of Korea, and would have tried to meet Japanese expansion of sea power, 
which now offers a powerful threat on the other side of the Pacific. … can 
you still believe the forest fire is far way? can you still say, “Let the Koreans, 
the Manchurians, and the chinese fight their own fight; it is none of our 
business”? … With this in view, we will not interest ourselves in the Sino-
Japanese conflict as a whole, but only in a certain phase of the conflict that 
affects foreigners in general and Americans in particular. … It means just 
this: the Mikado in the East and the Fascist and Nazis in the West are bent on 
conquering the world. As they have great mechanized armies, they believe 
they are destined to rule the world (Rhee, S. 1941: 9-11).
Rhee’s logic that what was happening in both east and west Eurasia was of 
relevance to U.S. national security, corresponded with the geopolitical logic 
of American realistic strategist, which opposed American isolationism and 
emphasize the threat posed by the Axis Powers (Iriye 2004: 164-9).
The second volume of Paekpŏm ilchi, which Kim started writing in 1941, 
explains that Kim also observed the times from the point of view linking Asia 
and the Pacific.
Since the Provisional Government was established, we have made much effort 
on the diplomatic front, but have received no official aid, only informal, from 
the governments of china, the Soviet Union and the U.S. Now, however, 
President Roosevelt announced to the world that “Korea will become a fully 
independent country,” and the chinese President of the House, Sun Ke (孫科), 
during a public address commemorating the 23rd anniversary of the March 
1st movement, argued that “the best solution for china to eliminate Japanese 
imperialism is to formally recognize the Korean Provisional Government.” 
Additionally, the Provisional Government has established a foreign relations 
committee in Washington and placed Dr. Rhee as its chair to energize 
diplomatic and propaganda efforts (Kim, K. 2008: 451).
Kim absolutely supported Rhee in his leadership of the diplomatic efforts 
towards the U.S. as chair of the foreign relations committee during the Asia-
Pacific War. Their solidarity, based on a common geopolitical perception, 
reached its climax during this time. Not only in the personal opinions of 
Rhee and Kim but also in the common view of Korean society in the U.S and 
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china, the grand trend of cooperation between the U.S. and china meant a 
truly “Asian-Pacific” War in geographical scope.32
The convergence of the two men’s geopolitical perceptions reached a 
climax when Rhee appealed for help from those within Korea through 
the “Voice of America” broadcasts from June to July of 1942. American 
communications technology rendered both sides of the Pacific into a 
unified geopolitical theatre for the independence struggle. The U.S. office 
of Strategic Services (oSS) requested that Rhee make his broadcasts in an 
effort to incite a guerilla war by the Korean people against Japan (Lew, Y. 
1996: 196). His broadcast began, “I am Syngman Rhee. I am speaking to my 
23 million countrymen scattered both in and outside Korea.” He announced 
in the broadcast that the Korean Provisional Government in chongqing 
and the Korean Gwangbok (literally, Light Restoration). Army were fighting 
Japan with financial support from America and the political support of the 
Guomindang.33 Up to this time, Rhee had advocated diplomacy and careful 
preparation for an eventual conflict, while Kim had been mainly concerned 
about interference from the Soviet Union despite the importance he attached 
to military action. That Rhee agitated for a guerilla war through the broadcast 
signified the historically meaningful convergence of Rhee and Kim’s 
geopolitical perceptions.
32 The solidarity between Rhee and the Provisional Government in chongqing signified 
an alliance of the non-communist nationalist between America and Asian continent. 
Syngman Rhee’s plans, which were passionately proposed from 1942 to 1943, for 
organizing Korean guerilla units, were the result of close consultation with Kim and 
signified the collaborative relationship and complete mutual trust between the two 
men (Jung, B. 2007: 295-332).
33 The contents of this section are as follows. “our provisional government is operating 
in chongqing under the leadership of the patriots Kim Ku, Yi Siyŏng, cho Wanku, 
cho Soang. our Restoration Army is led by generals such as Yi, ch’ŏng ch’ŏn, Kim, 
Yak San, Yu, Tong Yŏl, cho, Sŏngh Wan who have established a headquarters and are 
fighting the enemy. With the support of chinese Generalissimo chiang Kai-shek and 
his wife, we have received the materiel needed by our army to be rightfully called the 
army of a sovereign nation. our countrymen in the U.S., Hawaii, Mexico and cuba 
continue to send us financial support. We will therefore be able to continue supplying 
our army with what it needs, so that day by day its members and courage will grow 
(VoA Broadcast, June 13, 1943; Rhee, S. 1993: 291-2).
The Geopolitical Perceptions of Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee 127
At the same time, their geopolitical perceptions, which were so similar 
during the Asia-Pacific War, also had some differences. First was the 
perception on china. Since the time of his service as President of the 
Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, Rhee had understood pro-
independence activities within china to be important but he considered them 
secondary to efforts involving the U.S. and the West.34 As with his warning 
about the crisis of the “open Door Policy” before the Asia-Pacific War, during 
the war Rhee approached it as an application of the Atlantic charter to the 
Asia-Pacific region.35 overall, Rhee considered china secondary to the East 
Asia policy of the U.S.
on the other hand, Kim, while continuing to advocate autonomy vis-
à-vis Guomindang, placed a high value on china’s influence on efforts to 
regain Korea’s sovereignty. Kim considered the Sino-Japanese War as a more 
important campaign than the one of Europe and the Pacific in World War II. 
Kim regarded the political situation of Asia (especially china), from where 
the Asia- Pacific War was originated, as the most vital factor in the worldwide 
political situation.36 This can be seen in the fact that Kim welcomed Korea 
temporarily being included in the chinese theatre (of operations) at the end 
of the war.37 This reflected the urgent need of provisional government for the 
34 Regarding the division of labor between the provisional government and the Korean 
commission, Rhee trumpeted the role played by the later which he had established 
(Ko, J. 2004: 213-7).
35 These facts are clearly shown in the proceedings of the Korean Liberty conference 
which was held February 27 to March 1, 1942 under the leadership of Rhee. 
(cromwell, “Forward,” in Korean Liberty conference, 1942, Hotel Lafayette, 
Washington D.c.). This provided a counterpoint to the anti-Western spirit of the East 
Asia co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan, which proposed the aforementioned plan, did so in 
opposition to the 1943 Atlantic charter, as a “Pacific charter” (Kim, M. 2006: 219).
36 Kim on August 25, 1940, in a statement titled “My support for Sino-Korean 
collaboration,” said the following: “china’s struggle is not only for china, but on 
behalf of the entire world” (Paekpŏm haksurwŏn 2005: 100-1).
37 In a congratulatory message to the American commander of the chinese theater, A. 
c. Wedemeyer (1897-1989), Kim expressed his gratitude, saying that “including Korea 
in the chinese theater is a farsighted decision both in terms of military and political 
strategy” (Taehan min’guk imsi chŏngbu charyojip p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, volume 13, 
IV, 2006, 269). However, as a result of General order No. 1, which went into effect 
March 15, 1945, Korea came under the jurisdiction of the Supreme commander for 
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material assistance of the Guomindang government. It also reflected the risk 
of overdependence on the Guomindang by the Provisional Government. In 
fact, chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), who Kim first met in 1933, emphasized an 
anti-Japanese line based on Sun Yat-sen’s (1866-1925) Three Principles of the 
People (Kim, K. 2008: 544-5).38 Later on, Kim and fellow government officials, 
while adjusting the “Nine Principles of the Restoration Army” issued by 
chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang, did their best to maintain the independence 
of the Korean Gwangbok Army and the Provisional Government against 
Guomindang’s persistent attempt to control their action. As early as 1942, 
as prospects of chinese victory increased, the chinese began pressuring 
the Provisional Government in ways that seemed to presage restoration to 
the historically subordinate relationship (Ku, D. 1995: 108). But efforts by 
the Korean Provisional Government to maintain independence from china 
were limited not only by the need for material support from china but also 
by considerations colored by the history of a symbiotic alliance (Sunch’i ŭi 
tongmaengnon) (Han, S. 2006: 28-9).39
Second were perceptions on the United States. In Japan Inside Out, Rhee 
framed Korea’s loss of sovereignty in the historical contexts of the postwar 
settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, of WWI and the origins of WWII, and 
criticized the irresponsibility of the U.S. (Rhee, S. 1993: 217-28). Rhee’s overall 
point, embodied in the final line of the book, “Let the United States act—
and act now,” was in the same spirit as the strategy of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(1882-1945) and his second administration (1937-1940),40 which gradually 
the Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur, and his subordinate, John R. Hodge, who 
commanded the XXIV corps of the US Tenth Army.
38 Sun Yat-sen repeatedly asserted that the territories of smaller countries in the region 
including Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam were lands that were to be recovered 
by china. Moreover, he asserted that though the losses of Taiwan and Indochina 
occurred in situations “beyond its control,” the independence of Korea occurred when 
“china had no control,” so the issue logically should be “reopened” (Bae, K. 2006: 
238-50; Ku, D. 1995: 125). Korea’s independence activists needed china’s help to fight 
Japan and could only remain cautious against such geopolitical perceptions. 
39 Ko, Jung Hyoo has indicated that one of the reasons the Restoration Army could not 
closely collaborate with the American forces through the oSS was due to the subtle 
restrictions imposed by the chinese provisional government (Ko, J. 2004: 453).
40 The Roosevelt administration began in its second term to transform American foreign 
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put an end to American isolationism and began to envision spreading of U.S.-
style democracy in Eurasia (Rhee, S. 1993: 252). over time, Rhee’s thinking 
evolved such that he considered it necessary to keep American influence 
on the peninsula even after the achievement of restoration. To the contrary, 
Kim’s sentiments toward the U.S. were somewhat ambiguous. certainly, the 
Provisional Government under Kim’s leadership actively courted the U.S. in 
the pursuit of restoration, and understood the important role of the U.S. in 
the post-war world (Han, S. 2006: 26-7). Also, as described in Na ŭi sowŏn 
(My Hope, 1947), Kim viewed U.S.-style democracy in a favorable light. 
But as shown above, his basic ideal was confined in “Eastern Way, Western 
Technology” (Tongdo sŏgi). 
 
I do not advocate outright adoption of U.S.-style democracy. I was simply 
making a relative comparison between the despotic Soviet-style of democracy 
and the U.S.-style of democracy, which guarantees freedom of speech. I 
meant that if I had to choose one of the two, I would choose the one which 
guaranteed freedom of speech and ideas. I do not think that U.S.-style 
democracy is a perfect or complete political system. Just as in any other aspect 
of life, political systems also evolve. Moreover, a country like Korea which 
over the course of five thousand years has experienced many different systems 
of government will have had both defective and effective systems. Looking 
at the recent chosŏn era, institutions such as the office of Special Advisors, 
the censorate, and the Inspector General that applied ideas arising from 
among the people to the conduct of government were great systems. Such 
systems and those like the civil service examination system and secret royal 
commissioners are worth studying. I believe that we can learn many useful 
things if we carefully examine the systems of past generations (Kim, K. 2005: 
429-31).
policy from isolationism to participation on the world stage, once a certain amount 
of recovery from the economic crisis had been achieved (Iriye 2004: 131-69). In his 
“Quarantine Speech,” delivered october 1937 in chicago, Roosevelt did not explicitly 
name enemy states but did say that America must play a decisive role in an era marked 
by a “reign of terror and international lawlessness.” This put an end to the isolationist 
foreign policy that he had followed since he assumed the presidency in 1933 (Divine 
1981: 16).
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Kim was also impressed by the wealth and power of the U.S. during the war.41 
In Kim’s view, Northeast Asia was an open space which should never be 
exclusively dominated by the Soviet Union or Japan. However, we can hardly 
say that Kim thought the U.S. should therefore remain a permanent presence 
in Asia.
Third was the perception on the Soviet and communism. The distrust 
between the Guomindang and the chinese communists eventually broke 
out into armed conflict during and after the end of the Asia-Pacific War. It 
is therefore hard to believe that the Provisional Government and the Korean 
Gwangbok Army, who were closely tied with Guomindang, deeply trusted 
communists, having seen such actual and pernicious confrontation.42 Kim 
understood communism as a form of dogmatic toadyism, and also a “fearful 
dictatorship” premised on thought control.
Among all dictatorships, the ones to be feared most are those based on 
ideology or philosophy …. Soviet-style democracy which the communists 
advocate is amongst these the most thorough, and exercises dictatorial 
practices to their utmost (Kim, K. 2005: 427-8). 
Nevertheless, Kim’s Korean Independence Party (Han’guk tongniptang), 
was strongly exhorted by the Guomindang during the period of the Second 
41 Kim’s perception that the U.S. military was stronger than the Japanese one was 
decisively confirmed as he observed the infiltration training program of the oSS 
(Kim, K. 2008: 602).
42 Even as collaboration earnestly progressed, Kim deeply mistrusted Kim Wŏnbong 
and his fellows for “outwardly supporting nationalism but internally advocating 
communism” (Kim, K. 2008: 550-1). This attitude is clearly seen in the recollections 
of those around him. Kim Jun Yop experienced the chinese civil War as well as a 
sneak attack on Guomindang forces by the 8th Route Army after the establishment 
of the Second United Front, and recalled that these stirred in him a deep interest in 
communism (Kim, J. 1989a: 214-5). In a conversation with Kim Ku after the North-
South talks, one of his close lieutenants, Pak ch’anik, stated that “as can be seen in the 
Second United Front, communists make gestures only to achieve their ends and are a 
sort with which there can be no compromise.” Taking into account such statements, 
it does not seem likely that the left-right collaboration of the Korean Provisional 
Government was of transformative significance leading to a genuine cooperation 
(Namp’a Pak ch’anik chŏn’gi kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 1989: 321).
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United Front (國共合作) in china, collaborated with Kim Wŏnbong’s (1898-
1958) National Revolution Party (Minjok hyŏngmyŏngdang) across the 
ideological divide.43 Even after the end of WWII, Kim still held reservations 
about the Soviet, but remained within the political orientation to construct 
a united Asian front against Japan.44 on the other hand, Rhee was extremely 
wary of Soviet geopolitical expansion. Beginning in the 1920s, he argued 
that communism could undermine the national movement for sovereignty, 
leaving Korea to be taken advantage of by the Soviet, not to mention that he 
distrusted their economic policies as well.45 Moreover, Rhee framed WWII 
as a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism, and categorized the 
Soviet Union as totalitarian. His perception mirrored the Western liberal 
point of view that fascism and communism were both part of the same 
broader category of totalitarian governments (Rhee, S. 1993: 241-52; Iriye 
2004: 131-5). Lastly, Rhee thought that traditional geopolitical ambitions of 
Russia Empire were in resurgence by the rise of Soviet Union at the end of the 
war. The following is an excerpt from a message that Rhee sent to one of his 
followers:
My lifelong studies in international relations had dealt with Europe as well as 
with Asia. My travels in Europe also tended to sharpen my awareness of the 
significance of the trend of events in that part of the world. It was obvious that 
the nationalistic guerilla operating in southeastern Europe were themselves 
divided into two groups—communist and non-communist. When Roosevelt 
and churchill agreed not to invade the European continent through the 
43 Kim simultaneously believed that collaboration with the left actually diminished the 
effectiveness of national identity (The Association of commemorative Service for Kim 
Koo Scholarship ed. 1982: 297, 304).
44 Looking at the record of independence in retrospect, Kim also worried about the 
encroachment of the Soviets onto the Korean Peninsula. However, this point of 
concern was confined to the peninsula (Kim, K. 1984: 46-7; Kim, J. 1989: 426). This 
attitude was clearly differed from Rhee’s concern over the global meaning of cold 
War.
45 Refer to the following editorials, probably attributable to Rhee: “Kongsanjuŭi ŭi tang 
pudang” (“the rights and wrongs of communism”), T’aep’yŏngyang chapchi, March, 
1923; “Sahoe kongsanjuŭi e taehaya” (“regarding social communism”), T’aep’yŏngyang 
chapchi, July, 1924.
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Balkans, it was also apparent that an agreement had been reached to leave this 
area primarily to Soviet influence … and in Poland the Soviet occupation of 
eastern Poland gave communism a great advantage for exploitation of Russia’s 
design of expansion. … It was evident that President Roosevelt’s policy of 
‘unconditional surrender’ by the Rome-Berlin-Japanese Axis was being 
paralleled by another policy of Allied acquiescence in the essential pattern of 
Russian imperialism (oliver 1973: 197).46
Harboring such perceptions, Rhee became famous as a “precocious Warrior 
of cold War” by proclaiming at the San Francisco conference (April–June 
1945), where the charter of the United Nations was signed, that the post-war 
powers handed Korea over to Soviet influence in the Yalta secret agreements 
(Ko, J. 2004: 454-68). As the Asia-Pacific War came to a close, the anti-Russia 
geopolitical perception, which had existed during the Taehan Empire era, was 
resurrected anew in Rhee’s thinking.47
Fourth were perceptions on East Asia. The two men lived in different 
places: Rhee in the relatively stable America with its well-established 
institutions, and Kim in a turbulent Asia ruled by ‘war and revolution.’ As 
a result, there were differences in the way the two men perceived East Asia 
(Son, S. 1970: 41-52). Notwithstanding Truman’s (1884-1972) somewhat 
proud reminiscence that “our citizens were tightening their belts and making 
every sacrifice to help save the world from tyranny,” (Truman 1955: 224) the 
U.S. was a stable place during WWII, where people could even experience 
prosperity.48 Relatively speaking, the circumstances of the Korean Provisional 
Government in china were bleak. Kim stated that “while we were diehards 
46 This passage is quoted from oliver’s book in English. There is one mistake in the 
Korean translation of this book published in Konkuk University Press in 2002. The 
crux of this letter was that Russia’s traditional expansionism was resurgent, so the 
phrase “Soviet imperialism” is inaccurate. The original states “Russian imperialism” as 
well, so it is more accurate to refer to it thusly.
47 Shin Bok Ryong distinguishes between “anti-Russianism and anti-communism” in 
explaining the anti-communist stances of Kim and Rhee (Sin, B. 2003: 369-72).
48 During WWII, the U.S. experienced an existence completely different from those of 
Asia and Europe. Regarding America’s experience during the war, John Galbraith 
(1908-2006) states “in the history of warfare, there has never been so much talk of 
sacrifice without actual sacrifice” (Leffler 2007: 40).
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even when we were in Shanghai, in chongqing we were actually dying.” He 
also commented that his personal finances while in Shanghai were such that 
he was “a beggar even amongst beggars.” (Kim, K. 2008: 452, 485)49
Living in the U.S. where the communists held little clout, except the spy 
ring including Alger Hiss, Rhee could refuse to collaborate with communists 
and flippantly say that “I would rather raise chickens in the countryside” 
(oliver 2002: 224-225). For Kim, however, the dire straits faced by the Korean 
Provisional Government did not allow for such luxuries. continually facing 
internecine ideological strife, the Provisional Government was described as 
having “more factions than the number of chairs in the building they were 
renting” (chang, J. 1985: 207-9). Even though he did not follow communism 
and had no expectations of good will from the Soviet Union, while he 
was in china, which like Korea was undergoing “anti-feudal and anti-
foreign” strife, he accepted the political climate, which was such that both 
nationalism and socialism had to be accepted as “competitive companions in 
the liberation of the people” (Yun, D. 2006: 268). Thus, Kim had to achieve 
collaboration across the ideological divide, a unique experience which Rhee 
did not have.50 The post-war influence of the Soviet Union and the chinese 
communists expanded throughout Northeast Asia that included Korea. 
Rhee’s understanding of the American perspective was such that he foresaw 
the advent of the cold War, but he was less attuned to the atmosphere of 
revolution in Asia.51 While Kim’s geopolitical perception was narrower in 
49 Kim Ku’s mother, Kwak Nag Wŏn (1859-1939), repeatedly entreated that he conduct 
his revolutionary activities from the U.S. since the situation in Shanghai was so 
difficult, but he refused, stating that “revolutionary activities cannot be conducted 
from a place of opulence” (The Association of commemorative Service for Kim Koo 
Scholarship ed., 1982: 169).
50 choi Sang Yong opines that despite Kim’s firm anti-Soviet, anti-trusteeship stance 
after liberation, the action-oriented nationalist in him understood the potential of 
“national independence and independence-oriented left-right collaboration” (choi, S. 
1998: 169).
51 This is not to say that Rhee was ignorant of the revolutionary climate of Asia. He 
himself was a leader of an Asian people’s liberation movement, and had visited 
Russia twice; he knew full-well the revolutionary climate of Asia. Indeed, he 
understood the threat posed by this atmosphere which was being precipitated by 
Soviet influence. On this basis, during the independence movement and as the first 
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comparison, he was more sensitive to the revolutionary atmosphere of Korea 
and its environs.
V. coNcLUSIoN
The conclusions of this study are as follows. First, during the time of the 
establishment of the Taehan Empire and the Qing-Japan War (1894-1895), 
Kim and Rhee both developed a sense of independence and moved away 
from a china-centered geopolitical perception. They strengthened their 
sense of independence by accepting the principle of national sovereignty and 
joining the Protestant church which had boosted the principle of Westphalian 
sovereignty in Europe. Both men, as leaders first of the Korean Provisional 
Government then the Republic of Korea, foresaw the historical significance 
of Korean sovereignty vis-à-vis international politics. But the different ways 
in which each obtained his sense of independence led to different geopolitical 
perceptions. Unlike Rhee who looked toward the Pacific, Kim maintained 
aspects of the perceptual framework that he learned from the Tonghak 
movement and the Hwasŏ school. Such differences could be seen in the 
different threats each saw to the sovereignty of Korea. Rhee saw Japan and 
Russia as the main threats that had entered the void left by the downfall of the 
Sino-centric regional order. Kim did acknowledge the Russian threat, but his 
hostility was mainly focused towards Japan.
Secondly, when the Provisional Government experienced conflict over 
the matter of collaboration with the Soviet Union, Kim and Rhee presented 
a united front. Kim refused to follow the Soviet Union which was exercising 
considerable influence over the mainland including china, while Rhee 
operated in the U.S., keeping his hopes focused toward the Pacific. 
president of the Republic of Korea, he asserted that the U.S. must support and heed 
Asia more than ever. He criticized those in the U.S. with Atlantic-centered points of 
view, and agreed with those focusing on the Pacific (Oliver 1978: 67, 73, 101). In line 
with such views, Rhee, together with Chiang Kai-shek and Elpidio Quirino (1890-
1956), president of the Philippines (1948-1953), in 1949 prior to the Korean War, 
began calling for a Pacific Pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty (Kim, M. 2000: 
127-54).
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Third, the cooperation of Rhee and Kim during the Asia-Pacific War 
symbolized the geopolitical collaboration between china (Asia) and the 
U.S. (Pacific) against the Japanese ambitions for a Greater East Asia co-
Prosperity Sphere. Rhee predicted that the United States’ “open Door Policy” 
toward china would collide with Japanese plans for a Greater East Asia. To 
the Americans, who had grown complacent behind the buffer provided by 
the Pacific, he warned of the danger of a war in Asia crossing the ocean and 
posing a threat to American national security. Meanwhile, Kim operated a 
successful semi-military campaign with the aid of men like Yi Bong chang 
and Yun Bong Gil, established firm relations with china, and planned for 
active diplomacy toward the U.S. through Rhee.
Fourth, during the Asia-Pacific War, Rhee valued the might and worth 
of the U.S. foremost, considering china a secondary partner.52 on the other 
hand, Kim privileged the mutually beneficial relationship with china. Rhee 
focused on Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, and the totalitarian nature of 
communism. He also foresaw the escalation of the cold War between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. Though Kim likewise rejected communism, he did so 
because he saw it as a form of toadyism. on the contrary to Rhee, Kim did 
not see it as such a main global divisive issue in the aftermath of World War 
II.
Fifth, Rhee’s geopolitical perception formed in the stable environment of 
the U.S., and Kim’s perception formed in the turbulent environment of china; 
each had its own strengths and weaknesses. Rhee had a broad perspective of 
the world but was less attuned to the atmosphere of revolution in Asia. While 
Kim’s geopolitical perception was narrower in comparison, he was more 
sensitive to the revolutionary atmosphere of Korea and its environs. 
52 In his book published in 2009, Bruce cumings argues that the emergence of the 
U.S. as a world power followed on its transformation from an Atlantic-oriented U.S. 
to a Pacific-oriented U.S., and that this important “tipping point” in world history 
occurred at Pearl Harbor (cumings 2009). Viewed from this perspective, Rhee, who 
was living in the U.S. during the Asia-Pacific War, foresaw the historic flow referred 
to by cumings, and tried to put Korea atop this wave. oliver opines that “if the 
importance of Asia continues to rise, future researchers will take greater interest in 
Rhee, who contributed to the westernization, modernization and democratization of 
this region, which occupies half the world” (oliver 2002: 341).
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 Sixth, immediately after the end of World War II, Rhee and Kim 
collaborated in an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, and anti-trusteeship stance. 
But on August 15, 1948, when, as they had long hoped, the Republic of 
Korea finally assumed the mantle of sovereignty handed down from the 
Taehan Empire and the Provisional Government, the two men went their 
separate ways. As the cold War escalated, more differences emerged between 
the two men’s geopolitical perceptions. Those differences were evinced in 
their disagreement over a continental versus a maritime focus, since both 
sides wanted to keep the Korean Peninsula under their influence. For Rhee, 
who was serving as the first president of the Republic of Korea, the falling 
out with Kim was significant because the latter represented “those who are 
not wealthy,” unlike Rhee (Gayn 1948: 434). It also signified the loss of his 
most powerful and trustful ally, who once argued that “the first president 
of a unified Korea must be Dr. Rhee,” and one who shared his geopolitical 
perception (Sonu, J. 2009: 331). Despite these differences, the similar 
geopolitical perceptions shared by these two men, who contributed to the 
independence and founding of Korea, can provide a cornerstone for the 
geopolitical strategy of a 21st century Korea working to balance its continental 
and maritime priorities and continuing to face the problem of the North-
South division.53
53 According to his son’s witness, prior to his departing, for the North-South talks, 
Kim said the following: “You know the history of the Manchu invasion of 1636, 
right? Without the realism of ch’oe Myŏnggil (1586-1647), who compromised with 
the Manchus, the nation would probably have fallen. Subsequent generations have 
said ‘today, we cannot do without Myŏnggil; 100 years from now, we cannot do 
without the Samhaksa (three learned gentlemen who opposed negotiations with 
the Manchus, allying themselves with the Han chinese);’ they were referring to this 
sort of reasoning (Kimsin chŭngŏn, cho, G. et al. 1987: 368). This indicates that even 
though Kim agreed to a certain extent with Rhee’s proposal for the election of 1948 
and understood the urgency of establishing a government in South Korea, he also 
wished to play a role which was of historical necessity. Such was Kim’s quandary and 
his political legacy, one which Korea must fulfill, by both working towards unification, 
as mandated in the constitution, and building a more perfect nation-state.
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